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Doe Dancer I v. La Fuente, Inc., Nev. Adv. Op. 3 (Feb. 25, 2021)1
INTERPRETING THE TERM “EMPLOYEE” PURSUANT TO NEVADA’S MINIMUM
WAGE AMENDMENT AND NRS 608.0155
Summary
The definition of the term “employee” in Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada
Constitution, the Minimum Wage Amendment, (MWA) incorporates the economic realities test
of the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA). Moreover, NRS.608.0155’s expansion definition of the
term “independent contractor” does not limit MWA protected rights.
Background
Each appellant (Doe Dancers), at some point, performed as a dancer at Cheetahs Lounge,
owned by respondent La Fuente, Inc. (Cheetahs). The Doe Dancers were permitted to perform at
Cheetah’s as long as they had a sheriff’s card, state ID, work licenses, and costume, were not
“trashed” and were “standing up.” However, after receiving a performing shift, the Doe Dancers
were required to comply with a long list of posted rules that were strictly enforced by Cheetahs.
The long list of rules addressed the Doe Dancers’ manners, etiquette, social interactions,
personal hygiene, wound care, transportation and parking. The rules also included similar rules
that would be enforced in a typical workplace, such as rules regarding the use of the shared
refrigerator as well as rules prohibiting smoking, chewing gum, or using one’s personal phone
while performing. Cheetahs’ rules further digressed to intrusive limitations including, but not
limited to, informing the manager of current prescription medications, prohibiting the use of
glass and plastic cups in dressing rooms, requiring an intoxication test before each shift, and
requiring a minimum of three costume changes during each shift. The evidence showed that
these rules were strictly enforced. In addition to the posted rules, the Doe Dancers were
prohibited from dancing based on less tangible standards such as having a “bad attitude,” being
“total ghetto,” or acting like a “prima donna.”
Before each shift, the Doe Dancers were required to a sign a “Dancer Performer’s Lease”
agreement which disavowed any employment relationship. Additionally, the leasing agreement
gave Cheetahs the right to impose rules upon the Doe Dancers with absolute discretion. Despite
this contractual agreement, the Doe Dancers demanded minimum wage from Cheetahs claiming
they were employees. Cheetahs refused, considering the Doe Dancers to be independent
contractors.
As a result, the Doe Dancers filed a class action against Cheetahs in which both parties
filed cross motions for summary judgment. Doe Dancers sought a ruling that they were entitled
to minimum wages under both NRS Chapter 608 and Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada
Constitution, the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA).2 Cheetahs sought a ruling that the Doe
Dancers were not entitled to minimum wages because they were conclusively presumed to be
independent contractors pursuant to NRS 608.0155. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Cheetahs finding that the Doe Dancers were independent contractors under
both NRS Chapter 608 and MWA, and thus were ineligible to receive to minimum wages. The
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Doe Dancers appealed, abandoning their claims under NRS Chapter 806, solely relying on
claims under MWA.
Discussion
The Court reviewed the district court’s classification of the Doe Dancers as independent
contractors de novo. The Court held that to determine whether the Doe Dancers were correctly
classified as independent contractors was a question of statutory interpretation and the
constitutional reach of MWA.
In examining the statutory meaning of the MWA, the Court found that the term
“employee” was ambiguous on its face. The MWA text alone did not provide meaningful
clarification to the term “employee”. As such, the Court turned to external aids of interpretation.
The Court found that federal case law interpreting the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA)3 provided
interpretation guidance, reasoning that Nevada Courts look to analogous federal counterparts
when interpreting state provisions. Additionally, the Court further reasoned that the FLSA should
serve as an interpretation aid, because the Nevada Legislature has long recognized that federal
minimum wage laws provide a floor for workers’ protection in the state.
The Court found that because MWA’s definition of employee mirrored FLSA’s
definition for employee, it can presume that the Nevada Legislature enacted MWA with full
knowledge of FLSA. Thus, the Court concluded that the federal economic realities test found
within FLSA applied in determining MWA’s definition of employee.
The economic realities test of the FLSA consists of six prongs that must be sufficiently
met. While the Court noted that the FLSA’s definition of employee applied to exotic dancers
in the similar case Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club,4 the Court held that exotic dancers
do not make up a class that categorically receives the status of employee. Rather, the
economic realities test must be applied to the particular facts in each specific case. Here, the
court easily determined that each prong of the economic realities test was sufficiently met,
lending to support that the Doe Dancers should be considered employees.
Next, the Court examined whether NRS 608.0155’s definition of independent
contractor excluded the Doe Dancers from the constitutional protection of the MWA. While
Cheetahs contend that NRS 608.0155’s expanded definition of independent contractor does
not conflict with MWA’s definition of employee, the Court noted that independent contractor
and employee are mutually exclusive concepts and thus, the two could not be read to be in
harmony. However, the Court held that the Nevada Legislature intended the two laws to be
read harmoniously, thus limiting the NRS 608.0155 definition of independent contractors to
only apply to NRS Chapter 608 claims. Here, the Doe Dancers were only claiming protection
under MWA. Additionally, the Court held that even if NRS.608.0155 was intended to apply
to additional claims besides NRS Chapter 608 claims, it could not alter the protection of the
MWA as this would raise a separation of powers issue. The Nevada Legislature cannot create
exceptions to the right protected in the Nevada Constitution.
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Conclusion
The Court concluded that MWA’s definition of employee incorporates the economic
realities test of the FLSA. Additionally, the Court held that NRS.608.0155 did not exclude
the Doe Dancers from their rights under MWA. Here, because the Doe Dancers were
considered employees under MWA, and NRS 608.0155 could not impose any limitation on
this determination, the Doe Dancers were found to be entitled to receive minimum wages.
The Court reversed the district court’s order of summary judgment in favor of Cheetahs and
remanded for a proceeding consistent with this opinion.
Concurrence
Justice Stiglich issued a concurring opinion stating that she agreed with the majority
opinion that that the MWA incorporates the economic realities test of the FLSA, and that the test
was successfully met here. However, she differed, finding that the NRS 608.0155 indeed was
intended to limit the protection scope of the MWA. Justice Stiglich concluded that because the
Nevada Legislature did not have the power to do so, her diverting analysis would still produce
the same result as the majority opinion.

